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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I attempt to show how Davidson’s anti-sceptical argument 
can respond to the closureRK-based radical scepticism. My approach will focus on the 
closureRK principle rather than the possibility that our beliefs could be massively 
wrong. I first review Davidson’s principle of charity and the triangulation argument, and 
then I extract his theory on content of a belief. According to this theory, content of a 
belief is determined by its typical cause and other relevant beliefs. With this constraint 
on content, I argue that doubt must be local. Furthermore, since one cannot rationally 
believe that one’s commitment to the cause of beliefs could be false, our commitment to 
the denial of a sceptical hypothesis is not a knowledge-apt belief. Therefore, the 
closureRK principle is not applicable to rational evaluations of this commitment. As a 
result, the closureRK-based sceptical argument fails while the closureRK principle 
remains. 
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belief, knowledge-apt belief 
 
0. Introduction 
Donald Davidson is a prominent anti-sceptical exemplar in contemporary 
philosophy. He famously argued that belief is in its nature veridical.1 If the claim 
were true, one significant presupposition of scepticism would be unattainable. In 
Davidson’s view, scepticism regarding the external world presupposes that our 
beliefs about the external world could all be false. The idea of massive error in our 
beliefs can be motivated by considering ordinary cases where our senses present us 
misleading information. If we grant that a perceptual belief is fallible in particular 
cases, then it seems that nothing stops us from generalizing such a possibility of 
error. As far as we cannot exclude the possibility of massive error, scepticism is on 
the way.2 Accordingly, Davidson’s theory aims to offer compelling reasons as to 
why such a possibility is unintelligible. 
                                                                
1 Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” in his Subjective, 
Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 146. 
2 Notice that apart from the idea of massive error, scepticism also needs the closure principle to 
bring it happen.  
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The standard formulation of the closure-based sceptical argument consists 
of the following three claims where S is a subject, Q is the denial of the sceptical 
hypothesis and P is an everyday proposition: 
A. S cannot know that Q. 
B. If S knows that P, and S knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q. 
C. S knows that P. 
Here is the idea behind this formulation: in order for us to know something, 
we must be capable of ruling out the possibility of the sceptical hypothesis. If this 
requirement cannot be met, our epistemic status would be too weak to claim any 
knowledge. Notice that massive error in beliefs supports claim A implicitly. The 
reason is simple: in a sceptical scenario, ex hypothesi, our beliefs could be 
massively wrong while we continue believing them to be true. Thus, we cannot 
know whether the sceptical hypothesis obtains. If Davidson can offer good reasons 
to refute or dismiss the idea of massive error, then surely we are in a position to 
tell why claim A is not acceptable in the sceptical argument. Along one line, we 
can focus on how to interpret Davidson’s argument and whether his argument is 
sound, but I won’t pursue this line in this paper. Rather, I attempt to develop 
Davidson’s anti-sceptical argument against claim B. We can respond to the 
closure-based sceptical argument by rejecting the second claim or what is 
normally called the closure principle. In order to focus upon a plausible version of 
B, let’s look at a more specific principle formulated by Duncan Pritchard 
(forthcoming): 
The ClosureRK Principle 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p 
that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally 
grounded knowledge that p, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that q.3 
At first sight, this principle is more demanding than the closure principle in 
that while the closure principle only demands that knowledge be under known 
entailment, the ClosureRK principle requires that knowledge be based on a 
rational ground which can preserve across a well-conducted rational operation by 
a believer. However, the ClosureRK principle is also defensible for this reason: it 
captures the core idea that knowledge is a cognitive achievement, thus competent 
deduction, as a paradigm way of a rational process, cannot undermine our rational 
ground for knowledge. Therefore, what motivates the closure principle motivates 
                                                                
3 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our 
Believing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming in 2015). 
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the ClosureRK principle as well. Pritchard further argues that what underlies the 
ClosureRK principle is the idea: the reasons for believing p serve as reasons for 
believing any logical entailment of p. Pritchard thereby names the idea the 
universality of reasons thesis. 
Contemporary epistemologists generally agree that knowledge entails belief. 
Specifically, knowledge is responsive to a rational process and belief is knowledge-
apt. A knowledge-apt belief is a belief that aims at truth. In what follows, I will 
limit my discussion to knowledge-apt belief. Given this, a quick point is that if we 
cannot bear a knowledge-apt-belief attitude towards a proposition, then this 
proposition is not even in the market for rational knowledge. 
I will proceed as follows: In sections 1-2, I review Davidson’s theory of 
radical interpretation, the principle of charity and triangulation. In section 3, I 
extract Davidson’s view on doubt and belief and argue that doubt is in its nature 
local. What follows in section 4 is an attempt to show how a Davidsonian response 
to the ClosureRK-based sceptical argument proceeds by denying that the sceptical 
hypothesis does not obtain is a belief. In the ending section, I give some comments 
on this solution. 
1. Radical Interpretation and Principle of Charity 
Davidson appeals to the notion of radical interpretation in order to develop a 
theory of language, or more broadly, a theory of understanding. What is radical 
interpretation? Basically, it’s a fantasy scenario where one is in a completely new 
place, say a remote island or an aboriginal tribe. One tries to understand residents 
by figuring out what they believe and what their utterances mean. However, the 
interpreter has no prior knowledge of either the speaker’s beliefs or the meanings 
of the speaker’s utterances. In such a scenario, what are available to the interpreter 
are only publicly observable behaviors and utterances, or more specifically, S’s 
holding a sentence true at a certain time and a situation. Thus, the interpreter has 
to adopt a third-person stance to understand something internal to the speaker. 
Nonetheless, understanding a speaker seems to be extremely difficult as Davidson 
remarks, since there is interdependence between a speaker’s belief and the 
meaning of her utterance. Given the interdependence, it follows that the 
interpreter cannot assign a meaning to a speaker’s utterance without specifying 
the speaker’s beliefs, and one cannot identify the speaker’s beliefs without figuring 
out what her utterances mean. 
To see this, we need to think what we normally do in everyday life. We 
express our beliefs by uttering words or sentences. In doing this, we must also be 
competent to use our idiolect so that we are able to find the appropriate way to 
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express our beliefs. For instance, if I intend to express my belief that London is a 
modern city by uttering the sentence “London is a modern city,” then I am doing 
right since I choose the proper sentence to express the corresponding belief. 
Otherwise, my expression would be improper. Then suppose we are to interpret 
someone who utters the very sentence, how can we start our interpretation? The 
problem is we cannot assign the meaning London is a modern city to S’s utterance 
if we are ignorant of what S believes. By the same token, we cannot figure out 
what S believes unless we already have an idea of what her utterance means. If we 
plan to assign belief and meaning to a speaker in radical interpretation, the 
speaker’s holding true attitude can be explained by more than one interpretation. 
Suppose S utters ‘X’, then I take S to hold her sentence X true and give two 
interpretations as follows: 
(Int1) S believes P                                (Int2) S believes Q 
X means that P                                      X means that Q 
Hence S holds X true                            Hence S holds X true 
In (Int1) and (Int2), both interpretations provide an account of why S holds 
X true based on an ascription of S’s utterance and S’s belief. However, potential 
rival interpretations are countless. Thus, it would be very difficult for us even to 
set off the interpretation for a single utterance. That multiple interpretations are 
available for one utterance indicates that belief and meaning are co-varied in 
explaining one’s holding true attitude. Without more constraints, we can’t 
determine which interpretation is the optimal. 
In order to resolve this problem, Davidson appeals to the principle of 
charity. Roughly put, the principle of charity requires that the interpreter and the 
speaker share mostly true and coherent beliefs, by the interpreter’s own light. 
How can this principle help solve the problem of interdependence between belief 
and meaning? Notice that the interdependence problem arises out of the co-
variation of meaning and belief. Therefore, we are supposed to determine meaning 
while maintaining belief as a constant factor as far as possible. With belief being 
fixed, we can ascribe meaning to one’s utterance, and those ascriptions are not 
absurd in our own light. For example, let S say “there’s a hippopotamus in the 
refrigerator.” Davidson remarks that we prefer interpreting S’s utterance as saying 
that there is an orange in the refrigerator rather than there is a hippopotamus in 
the refrigerator.4 The reason is that we find the former interpretation to be more 
reasonable when S’s further account includes descriptions that we normally take 
                                                                
4 Donald Davidson, “On Saying That,” in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), 101. 
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an orange to fit better, rather than a hippopotamus. Notice, here we take our 
beliefs about orange into consideration when determining the meaning of S’s 
utterance. 
Brueckner objects that guaranteeing that the interpreter and the speaker 
share beliefs as much as possible, as in the orange case, would result in ridiculous 
interpretations when the speaker and the interpreter live quite different lives, 
such as when an interpreter from tropical area ascribes a belief to a Siberian 
resident that he has never seen snow.5 What’s worse, not only is massive 
agreement in beliefs not enough, but also it won’t be better if we add that we 
assign similar beliefs to a speaker by referring to similar evidence. The key reason 
is that my envatted counterpart and I have subjectively indistinguishable 
perceptual experience, and therefore our evidence for beliefs is on a par. 
Accordingly, it is required by charity to attribute true and coherent beliefs to her, 
but this move is at odds with my intuition that a BIV cannot have true beliefs 
about her environment. Moreover, unless we as interpreters have generally true 
beliefs, our attributed beliefs to others could not be true. In other words, it makes 
no sense to assign true beliefs if interpreters are massively wrong. Thus, there is 
something wanting in defense of the principle of charity, and Davidson is also 
aware of the weakness. Later on, Davidson puts forward the omniscient argument, 
but it’s not what we should pursue here because he renders it as a useless 
argument on the one hand, and there are fatal problems with this argument on the 
other hand.6 Therefore, I will proceed to Davidson’s triangulation argument which 
takes over the role of omniscient argument as articulating and defending the 
principle of charity. 
2. Triangulation 
What is lacking in the previous formulation of charity is that, only massive 
agreement and similar evidence cannot make beliefs generally true. A crucial 
problem is if we can’t determine the cause of beliefs, it is still possible that our 
beliefs are mistaken in the main since our beliefs may be caused by the evil demon 
rather than an objective world. Consequently, Davidson has to settle the issue how 
a belief gets its content. In “Rational Animals,” Davidson suggests a triangulation 
model of radical interpretation: 
                                                                
5 Anthony Brueckner, “Charity and Skepticism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly  67 (1986): 264-
68. 
6 Donald Davidson, “Reply to A. C. Genova,” in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lewis 
Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 192-194. 
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If I were bolted to the earth, I would have no way of determining the 
distance from me of many objects. I would only know they were on some line 
drawn from me towards them. I might interact successfully with objects, but I 
could have no way of giving content to the question where they were. Not being 
bolted down, I am free to triangulate, one that requires two creatures. Each 
interacts with an object, but what gives each the concept of the way things are 
objectively is the base line formed between the creatures by language. The fact 
that they share a concept of truth alone makes sense of the claim that they have 
beliefs, that they are able to assign objects a place in the public world.7 
A triangulation, just like a triangle in geometry, involves three points and 
three lines. It consists of an interpreter I, a speaker S, an object O, and lines 
connecting I, S and O respectively. I-O and S-O are both causal relations between 
a subject and the external world, while S-I forms a social network between two 
subjects. In triangulation, both subjects respond to the object located in a shared 
world and react to each other’s reactions. Why appeal to such an argument? I 
suppose Davidson is in need of a new argument to justify the principle of charity 
and to establish that belief is in its nature veridical. How can he achieve this task 
via triangulation? Davidson urges that,  
we must, in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take the objects 
of a belief to be the causes of that belief.8  
However, in determining the cause of a belief, we have to face the ambiguity of 
the concept of cause. The ambiguity is two-fold. On the one hand, one cannot 
locate the object that causes one’s belief. The cause of one’s belief may be distal or 
proximal, and it may lie at any point along the I-O line; on the other hand, one 
cannot determine what aspects of the object typically cause one’s belief. In 
triangulation, what is essential is that when two causal lines converge, each can 
locate the cause of their belief. The reason is that what causes my belief may stand 
at any point along the I-O line, and so does whatever causes your belief. 
Nonetheless, what causes your belief can’t be something in my mind or stimuli in 
by brain (i.e., proximal), therefore the cause of my belief must be somewhere in 
the external environment where our causal lines meet. Is the convergence enough 
to specify the cause of belief? The answer is no. Davidson needs the I-S line to 
identify the cause of belief as well. To see this, recall the orange in the refrigerator 
case. Even interpreter and speaker can locate where the cause of their beliefs is, 
                                                                
7 Donald Davidson, “Rational Animals,” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001), 105. 
8 Davidson, “A Coherence Theory,” 151. 
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they have a disagreement about what the object is. Only through further 
descriptions, they can settle whether the cause is an orange or a hippopotamus. 
Those further descriptions are not only further information that can disambiguate 
the cause of belief, but also a requirement for a rational belief. The role of I-S line 
is significantly vital in two aspects.  
Firstly, it provides the space of error. Since only in communication, both 
interpreter and speaker are in a position to identify the cause of their beliefs. 
When each alone attributes the cause of beliefs or when they assign beliefs to each 
other without communication, they sometimes make mistakes. However, it is 
implausible to correct this mistake by oneself since one cannot distinguish what is 
true from what is false. Communication provides a space in which one could 
realize that the truth of one’s belief is determined by an objective world which 
one shares with others. 
Secondly, it seems that what is at issue here is language communication. It 
is true that we can identify the cause of a belief only in communication, but 
communication is not only a matter of language, it’s also a matter of thought. In 
order to specify an orange as the cause of a belief, the interpreter considers several 
sentences of the speaker, not only the first claim that “there’s a hippopotamus in 
the refrigerator.” Those sentences help to determine whether the speaker is 
talking about an orange or a hippopotamus. Meanwhile, given that sentences 
express thoughts, we can infer that if the speaker’s belief is about an orange, a set 
of further beliefs should also be endorsed by the speaker.  
Obviously, Davidson is here invoking semantic holism. Semantic holism is 
the thesis that meaning of a sentence is determined by other related sentences in 
the language. Even though it is impossible to draw a clear line where related 
sentences end, I suppose the core idea behind it is still plausible. We can motivate 
semantic holism by considering the indeterminacy of interpretation.9 In 
developing a theory of meaning for a language, one must deal with the totality of 
utterances in that language. However, given a certain finite amount of evidence, 
we can have more than one theory of interpretation that suffices to account for 
the evidence. Different interpretations can differ in a particular assignment of 
meaning and belief, but would be equally plausible in explaining the total 
evidence. It is the whole sentences and beliefs that have equally satisfying 
explanation to one’s action regardless of differences in minor places. What follows 
from the indeterminacy of interpretation is the holistic nature of meaning and 
belief rather than a practical or cognitive limitation in interpretation. Another 
                                                                




reason to support semantic holism is to appeal to the inferential property between 
meaning and belief. For instance, ‘orange’ is inferentially connected to ‘fruit,’ and 
further inferentially connected to ‘non-meat’; similarly, my belief that this is an 
orange is inferentially connected to my belief that this is a fruit and that this is not 
meat. The holistic structure of meaning and belief not only serve as an explanatory 
tool in accounting for one’s mental content, but also constitute a normative 
regulation on any attribution of meaning and belief. Therefore, to entertain a 
singular proposition is not possible in Davidson’s view; at least the rationality of 
thought and language can only be appreciated in a holistic structure. 
To summarize, in the triangulation model, the content of a belief is 
determined by two factors. The first is the cause of the belief, which is indicated 
by I-O and S-O lines; the second is other relevant beliefs in the belief system, 
which is also a social trait embodied in the S-O line. So far, Davidson may have 
plenty of resources to argue that belief is in its nature veridical, and surely one can 
proceed to argue against the possibility of massive error. However, I will bear in 
mind his view on the content of belief and then turn to his comment on doubt and 
belief.  
3. Belief, Doubt and Content 
When it comes to beliefs, Davidson emphasizes that a belief must have a 
determinate content. What determines a belief’s content then? According to the 
previous discussion, we can specify the content of a belief by relating it to a world 
of further beliefs or its typical cause. See the following remark of Davidson: 
Not only does each belief require a world of further beliefs to give it content and 
identity, but every other propositional attitude depends for its particularity on a 
similar world of beliefs.10 
By relating a belief to other beliefs, we can determine the very content of 
the belief in question. This claim is also supported by the semantic holism 
endorsed by Davidson. And since other propositional attitudes, like doubt, hope 
and wishful thinking, etc. depend on beliefs, we can only proceed to doubt by 
having beliefs in the first place.  
Davidson thus gives priority to belief among different propositional 
attitudes. Why is this plausible? To see this, let’s have a look at the following 
example. When S doubts that there is a tree in the garden, she must have 
something in mind to support her doubt. These things in mind are beliefs she 
actually holds, like that a tree is an object with branches and trunk and that a 
                                                                
10 Davidson, “Rational Animals,” 99. 
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garden is a space where plants are cultivated and displayed. Without those further 
beliefs in play, her doubt regarding the proposition would be void of content and 
thereby nonsense. The same holds for other propositional attitudes like hope that 
there is a tree in the garden, or fear that there is a tree in the garden. The core idea 
is that, in order to have a propositional attitude towards a proposition, or having a 
thought, it is necessary to have a network of related beliefs which serve to make 
the propositional attitude in question intelligible and contentful. Therefore, the 
starting point of any propositional attitude is belief, and so is doubt. 
In terms of doubt, Davidson proposes a constraint: 
It is only after belief has a content that it can be doubted. Only in the context of 
a system tied to the world can a doubt be formulated.11 
Davidson’s claim here can be split up into two aspects. One is how to have a 
doubt; the other is how to formulate a doubt if we had it. However, on closer 
inspection, I suspect Davidson has only one thing in mind. It is obvious that the 
logic of doubt, according to Davidson, presupposes belief with a content. That is to 
say; it is not possible to doubt that p unless p has a content, and it is only by 
having a prior set of relevant contentful beliefs that one can give this doubt a 
content. This claim is a natural consequence of the previous discussion on the 
order of propositional attitude, which says that belief is prior to doubt.  
Suppose then we form a genuine doubt that p by having a prior set of 
relevant contentful beliefs, why do we have to appeal to a context of system tied 
to the world in order to formulate the doubt? Won’t it be enough for us to have a 
set of beliefs, worldy or otherwise, that can help us to determine the content of 
the proposition being doubted? Here, we need to return to the question, in virtue 
of what the content of a belief is determined. I have made it clear that both a set of 
further beliefs and the typical cause of a belief contribute to determining the 
content of a belief. However, the content-determining role of the typical cause is 
different from that played by the further relevant beliefs. In order to guarantee 
that our beliefs are objective, coherence between beliefs does not suffice. What is 
essential is that those beliefs should be about the external world, i.e., the origin of 
the content of beliefs is the external world. Thus, if we intend to formulate a 
doubt that p, we use our language to express this thought. Given that Davidson 
argues that thought and language are interdependent, it follows that the same 
content entertained by thought can be expressed by language. To sum up, belief 
and sentences owe its original content to the external world.  
                                                                
11 Donald Davidson, “Reply to Barry Stroud,” in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, 165. 
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In what follows, I will explore the consequence of Davidson’s views about 
doubt and belief. It seems that what is entailed by Davidson’s views in this respect 
is that doubt can’t be wholesale. Here is the reason. In order for S to have a doubt 
that p, she must identify the content of her doubt that p. However, S can do this 
only by relating p to other relevant contentful beliefs which she holds; that is to 
say, S is required to believe for her doubt to take place. Also, since other relevant 
beliefs are connected to an external world, a doubt is therefore about an external 
world as well. Here, what S believes is fundamental to what S doubts, so S’s doubt 
presupposes S’s belief. The idea that there is a wholesale doubt is simply 
unintelligible, for a wholesale doubt puts all one’s beliefs into question and 
therefore we can’t find any leftover beliefs to determine the content of those 
propositions being doubted. The result is that the idea of a wholesale doubt simply 
can’t get off the ground. This is so not because of a constraint on our cognitive 
capability, but rather because the essence of doubt excludes a wholesale doubt. A 
wholesale doubt is impossible, and thereby doubt must be in its nature local. 
4. Consider the ClosureRK Principle Again 
Recall the ClosureRK principle, and let’s take “There’s a rabbit in front of me” as p 
and “I am not a BIV” as q; then an instance of ClosureRK would be as follows: 
If S has rational grounded knowledge that there is a rabbit in front of me and S 
competently deduces belief that I am not a BIV via knowledge that there is a 
rabbit in front of me, then S has rational grounded knowledge that I am not a 
BIV. 
Given what I have discussed, I doubt whether this instance is plausible. It 
fails not because ClosureRK fails, but rather that the instantiation of q is rather 
dubitable in this case. Specifically, I am wondering whether S could have a belief 
attitude towards the proposition that I am not a BIV. If not, this proposition would 
lie beyond the realm of rational knowledge. However, it is still not clear why that 
I am not a BIV doesn’t count as a belief. 
What is necessary to have a thought? Or more specifically, what does it take 
to have a belief? Apart from what we have discussed earlier, Davidson maintains 
that: 
In order to have a belief, it is necessary to have the concept of belief.12 
What is the concept of belief? One may suggest that the concept of a belief 
is the meaning of the concept ‘belief.’ In this sense, having the concept of belief is 
                                                                
12 Davidson, “Rational Animals,” 104. 
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a precondition to use the word ‘belief’ in a sentence, which is similar to 
understanding the meaning of ‘desk’ before using the word in a sentence. 
However, this is not what Davidson has in mind. Davidson won’t deny that there 
is a strong relationship between language and thought, so that in order to have a 
thought such as a belief, S must be able to express that belief in language. But the 
core idea of what is the concept of a belief is something other than this. 
We can articulate the concept of a belief, as Davidson later suggests, by 
referring to the concept of objective truth. Objective truth requires that the truth 
of a belief is not determined by any of the subject’s mental states. Rather, a belief 
owes its truth partly to the external world. Accordingly, the truth of my belief is 
not determined merely by my mental states, and it is quite natural to assess my 
belief in part by reference to how the world is. If a belief is capable of being true 
or false, correct of incorrect, then to have a belief that p is different from it is true 
that P. After all, it is always possible that what I believe is not the case. How can 
we cash out the possibility that my belief could be wrong? Davidson emphasizes 
that linguistic communication could show command of the contrast between what 
is believed and what is the case. Further, I contend that the possibility of a 
thought’s being true or false is best illustrated by (i) making sense of the possibility 
by appealing to relevant beliefs that S holds and (ii) [….] from S’s perspective.  
Why is this move acceptable? The claim (i) is based on Davidson’s idea just 
mentioned. In linguistic communication, when the difference between what is 
believed and what is the case is revealed, S who finds her prior belief was wrong 
must be possible to make this wrong belief intelligible, otherwise there cannot be 
such thing as a recognizable error. This error is intelligible just because S’s beliefs 
in stock can account for such a mistake, and can accommodate a revised new 
belief. As to claim (ii), why making sense of the possibility has to be from S’s 
perspective? The simple reason is: thought is always someone’s thought, thus 
when attributing thought to someone S, we ought to consider if this thought can 
be held from S’s own light. In other words, we should take into consideration 
whether S has the network of beliefs to maintain the belief in question. It is for 
this reason that Davidson remarks:  
I reserve the word ‘concept’ for cases where it makes clear sense to speak of a 
mistake, a mistake not only as seen from an intelligent observer’s point of view, 
but as seen from the creature’s point of view.13 
Here is a case in point. If I believe that the Lake District is in Scotland, I 
should be aware that the belief could be wrong. What marks my awareness then? 
                                                                
13 Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 9. 
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Is it the claim that my belief could be wrong? Or is it something further that could 
make the supposed wrong belief intelligible? Awareness of this possibility of being 
wrong does not bring us any closer to the intelligibility of being wrong, we have 
to establish a room for the belief to be wrong. How is this room to be built? From 
my perspective and what Davidson has argued, the room of false belief rests on 
many other true beliefs. To realize that this belief could be wrong does not require 
us to find more evidence to support this claim. What is at stake is that it must be 
possible to make sense of when the belief is regarded as false. My example 
continues: suppose my belief that the Lake District is in Scotland is wrong (it is 
actually wrong), its being false would be intelligible for the reason that I had 
misidentified Lomond National Park, which is instead located in Scotland, as the 
Lake District, or the reason that I was ignorant of the boundary between Scotland 
and England, which caused my failure to recognize that the Lake District is a part 
of England. In this case, my false belief remains possible because it can be 
explained by other beliefs I still hold, such as that I believe that I had 
misidentified Lomond National Park as the Lake District, or that I believe that I 
was unsure where the boundary between Scotland and England lies. The point is 
that a certain belief’s being wrong does not lead to a breakdown in my belief 
system so that I still have beliefs to which I appeal to account for this possibility.  
Here, I need to clarify what the breakdown means. When we find a prior 
belief to be wrong, it is natural for us to explain this situation by appealing to 
some undoubted beliefs, or a step further, to adjust to this change by changing 
some beliefs consequently. Changing the epistemic status of a belief, i.e. being 
true, being false and doubtful etc., may result in a chain of changes in our belief 
system, and the degree of change is determined by its status in the belief system. 
What I contend here may sound like a Quinean picture of knowledge,14 but I shall 
limit my discussion to the content of beliefs only, i.e. what may cause a drastic 
change in the content of beliefs in the belief system. I would say nothing about 
adopting or abandoning beliefs for practical reasons or moral reasons.15 To 
                                                                
14 According to Quine, our whole system of scientific claims, or our “web of belief,” faces the 
tribunal of experience as a unity. When encountered with recalcitrant experience, or experience 
that does not fit our expectations, we could change observation beliefs, meanings of beliefs or 
even logical laws to accommodate this change. Essentially, nothing in our belief system is 
immune to revision. However, logical laws or fundamental hypotheses of a theory are so 
important that any change in them would result in massive changes in our belief system. 
Restrained by the maxim of minimum mutilation, we tend to avoid drastic changes and make 
adjustments in other places. 
15 For instance, a doctor may, for the patient’s benefit, tell her something that isn’t true. In this 
case, a false belief is adopted for practical reasons. Likewise, we tend to think that cheating is 
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summarize, what I mean by breakdown of a belief system is a drastic change in the 
content of beliefs in the system. The crux is what can cause such a breakdown? In 
my view, the answer can be easily found in the origin of content of beliefs. Since a 
belief gets its content from other related beliefs and external causal object, what 
causes a breakdown in a system must be fundamental commitments in these two 
aspects, i.e., those about the relations between beliefs and those regarding the 
external world. The former are logical truths, and the latter are our commitments 
to the external world or its sceptical counterpart. There is no wonder that a 
change in logical truth such as declining the law of identity would have a 
devastating consequence in our belief system. But it is not equally clear what if a 
change occurs in our commitments to the external world, or to the sceptical 
scenario for a sceptic. Let’s see the following pair: 
I am a BIV = the sceptical hypothesis does obtain 
I am not a BIV =the sceptical hypothesis does not obtain 
From the non-sceptical perspective, we are committed to the sceptical 
hypothesis not obtaining, i.e., that I am not a BIV. What comes next is a supposed 
change in this commitment. Our commitment changes to I am a BIV, or that the 
sceptical hypothesis does obtain. What follows this change? Apparently, our 
ordinary beliefs regarding the allegedly external object are all changed since the 
causes of beliefs are only stimuli generated by a supercomputer. It seems that we 
can still imagine what it is to be a BIV, but there is surely something wrong with 
this. In normal circumstances, when we talk about “there is a tree in front of me,” 
this belief is caused by and therefore about a tree standing in front of the 
speaker/believer; while in BIV case, we find it plausible that the same sentence 
would be caused by and thereby about a series of stimuli regardless of the same 
subjective perceptual experience. However, what makes our claim about the 
change of content plausible? It is not that someone had been or is now in the exact 
sceptical situation, but that some cases we encountered in normal circumstances, 
like dreams and hallucinations, underlie the plausibility of such claim locally. 
Nonetheless, the local plausibility does not easily extend to universal, so the 
sceptical hypotheses usually rest on a thin sense that a sceptical scenario is not a 
logic contradiction thus it is metaphysically possibility. However, if I have been 
always a BIV from birth, chances are that I could never see that my beliefs are 
                                                                                                                                       
morally wrong. Even though cheating can bring benefits to an individual at times, given certain 
moral considerations such as that we should be righteous and we should treat others fairly, we 
have sufficient moral reasons to abandon the belief that cheating is a good behaviour. The point 
is that we change beliefs for non-epistemic reasons in everyday life. 
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about stimuli generated by a supercomputer. Even though the supercomputer can 
bestow me any stimuli needed, my belief can never get content about the 
computer. What’s more, I couldn’t have an idea of what the objective world is. 
Since in order to get the content from the objective world, BIV must be isolated 
from the supercomputer, otherwise the belief would still be about stimuli rather 
than worldly objects. It is obvious that by changing our fundamental commitment 
to the cause of our beliefs, we are committed to change the content of our 
ordinary beliefs as well. What is crucial now is that, from my perspective, all my 
previous beliefs would lose their content since they couldn’t be about the external 
world as I earlier presumed. However, I cannot make sense any of the false belief 
because I have no any contentful beliefs left to which I appeal, thus this possibility 
of its being false, or the possibility that I am a BIV cannot be genuinely 
appreciated by me. If I cannot appreciate the possibility of being false, then the 
original proposition that I am not a BIV does not qualify as a belief at all. It does 
not count as a belief because no one can appreciate this proposition’s being false 
with determinate content. 
Interestingly, the case would be likewise if we start from a sceptical 
hypothesis. If we start with the commitment that I am a BIV, then supposing the 
possibility that I am not a BIV would also change the content of all beliefs already 
formed. All my beliefs are about computer stimuli, and none of them is caused by 
the external world. If I were to form any belief about the external world due to 
the change of my commitment, I would have to sweep all my previous beliefs and 
form new basic beliefs from the scratch. Since no any contentful belief remains to 
help me identify the content of my belief that I am not a BIV, this initial 
commitment fails to be a belief either. Thus, it seems that no matter what we are 
committed to at first, whether I am a BIV or not, as far as this commitment leads 
to a massive change of the content of beliefs, it cannot be a knowledge-apt belief 
at all. 
To sum up, in order to have a knowledge-apt belief, we must have the 
concept of knowledge-apt belief. We can command the concept of knowledge-apt 
belief by having the concept of objective truth. Objective truth requires that we 
are aware of and are capable of appreciating the possibility of a belief’s being true 
or false. And this possibility cannot be appreciated unless we have some related 
contentful beliefs to identity the content of the very belief. Crucially, a change in 
our fundamental commitment to the cause of beliefs would result in a total change 
of content in all beliefs, which leaves us no contentful belief at all to make this 
possibility intelligible. Therefore, it is impossible to appreciate the possibility of 
our fundamental commitment’s being false from our own perspective. It is now 
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clear that our commitment does not meet the requirement of having a belief. And 
it follows that the sceptical hypothesis does not obtain is not a knowledge-apt 
belief. Thus, the ClosureRK principle is not applicable to the evaluation of the 
sceptical hypothesis. 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that our commitment to the denial of the sceptical hypothesis is not 
a rational belief; therefore it cannot be applied to the ClosureRK principle. But it 
is still not clear why sceptics and non-sceptical epistemologists take it as a belief? 
The therapeutic answer from Davidson is that they both misconceive how a belief 
can maintain its content while changing its content determining conditions. For 
sceptics, they wrongly contend that the content of beliefs can be the same while 
the cause of beliefs changed dramatically and that a universal doubt is a contentful 
doubt. Therefore, they hold a belief-like attitude towards the proposition that the 
sceptical hypothesis does not obtain via having other genuine contentful everyday 
belief. Meanwhile, it is tempting to think that our increased success of attributing 
ordinary beliefs to others, may serve as a reason to justify that the sceptical 
hypothesis does not obtain is very likely to be true. However, I am afraid that this 
idea also goes against Davidson’s claim that it is absurd to look for a justifying 
ground for the totality of beliefs. Our commitment to the cause of beliefs serve as a 
ground to attribute content to all beliefs, but there is no need to justify this ground 
since it is in nature outside the reach of any rational beliefs and therefore non-
justifiable. 
Davidson arrives at the conclusion that doubt is local, and this conclusion 
echoes Wittgenstein’s comment on the structure of reasons. Thus, I would further 
explore the details between these two diagnoses. Regarding the nature of doubt, 
Wittgenstein claims:  
[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those 
turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that 
certain things are indeed not doubted. But it isn’t that the situation is like this: 
We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest 
content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.16  
In this quotation, Wittgenstein maintains that it is only possible to doubt 
when some propositions are undoubted. Wittgenstein advances his argument from 
considering the certainty of propositions. Propositions have different degree of 
                                                                
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. D. 
Paul an G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §§341-3. 
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certainties, some of which we are pretty sure while others are not. Thus, 
propositions with the highest certainty can provide rational support for those 
which have less certainty, but it is because of the highest certainty that those 
propositions are groundless. They are groundless because no propositions are more 
certain to provide rational support for them. What follows is that there can’t be 
rational doubt regarding those hinge propositions on which any rational 
evaluations take place. In a nutshell, doubt must be local in its nature. 
Even though Davidson and Wittgenstein arrive at the same conclusion, 
reasons for the conclusion are different. Davidson draws this conclusion from a 
consideration on semantic/mental content, i.e., what makes a doubt with a 
determinate content? In contrast, Wittgenstein focusses upon the epistemic 
ground of doubt, i.e., what makes a doubt epistemically rational? It is natural to 
ask whether a contentful doubt is epistemically grounded. Suppose I doubt that 
this is an orange, I may have plenty of content-determining beliefs that an orange 
is a round shape fruit, juicy and tastes sweet and sour. Those beliefs can give my 
doubt a content about an orange rather than a rock. But it is likely that none of 
these beliefs serves as an epistemic ground to support my doubt. Since to 
rationally doubt this is an orange, I need to have some evidence like an 
experienced and reliable farmer told me that it’s not an orange. Conversely, an 
epistemically grounded doubt may not come with a determinate content. If I was 
informed by an experienced and reliable farmer that this is not an orange, then I 
can rationally doubt that it is an orange. However, if I don’t have belief that an 
orange is a round shape fruit, juicy and tastes sweet and sour, I may continue 
believing that this is a round shape fruit, juicy and tastes sweet and sour while 
maintaining the doubt that this is an orange, which is very implausible. In this 
case, people would say my doubt is not about an orange since I believe other 
propositions that fit perfectly with the orange in front of me. One may find it 
more plausible to argue that the farmer’s information is not reliable, or that 
‘orange’ in the farmer’s language is not the same as in our language. My point is, if 
we don’t have relevant beliefs to determine the content of a doubt, it would be 
impossible to appreciate any epistemic support for your doubt. A moral we can 
draw is that the content requirement of a doubt doesn’t coincide with its epistemic 
support. However, a further question is, in order to rationally doubt something, do 
we have to have both content and epistemic support in place? If the answer is yes, 
then Wittgenstein and Davidson could go hand in hand in their respective 
responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. 
I suppose here is a reason to answer positively. In order to have a rational 
doubt, it is not only a matter of having a contentful doubt, but also having a 
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rationally supported doubt. Content of the doubt determines what the subject of 
the doubt is, and epistemic support for the doubt determines whether the doubt 
about something is well-motivated. If I aim to have a rational doubt on my friend 
Weighty’s weight, I need to know first what weight is and what Weighty’s weight 
is to be understood. Besides, I also need to know what ground I have in order to 
doubt Weighty’s weight. The first requirement can guarantee that my 
propositional attitude is really about Weighty’s weight rather than Weighty’s 
height or Heighty’s weight, while the second requirement can form this 
propositional attitude as a doubt, rather than believing or wishful thinking. A 
doubt without determinate content cannot be distinguished from other doubt, and 
a doubt without a rational support cannot be a doubting attitude at all. 
Accordingly, those two requirements are not only compatible, but also mutually 
supported. In this sense, doubt is essentially local both in terms of its content and 
its epistemic support. Indeed, Wittgenstein and Davidson could have a unified 
diagnosis of the sceptical illusion that a wholesale doubt is attainable. 
It is now clear that while the ClosureRK principle is plausible, it does not 
licence the sceptical conclusion. What is pivotal is that this principle is only 
applicable to (knowledge-apt) beliefs. Unfortunately, our commitment to the 
denial of the sceptical hypothesis is not a (knowledge-apt) belief. From a 
Davidsonian perspective, a (knowledge-apt) belief essentially involves other 
content-giving beliefs. Commitment to the denial of the sceptical hypothesis is so 
fundamental that, when being doubted, any contentful beliefs would be discarded 
therefore. Hence, it will be impossible to take it as a rational, contentful and 
(knowledge-apt) belief. As a result, we can retain the ClosureRK principle while 
evading the sceptical challenge apparently posed by this principle.17 
 
                                                                
17 I am grateful to Duncan Pritchard and Allan Hazlett for helpful discussions. My research is 
funded by China Scholarship Council and University of Edinburgh. 
